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I. Introduction 
 In the aftermath of widespread international conflicts and civil unrest, many have come to 
argue that civil society organizations play a fundamental role in facilitating stabilization and 
democratization in conflict-ridden areas (Belloni 2001, Dorner and List 2012).  These 
organizations are known to enhance the pursuit of individual interests and opportunities for 
society as a whole, as exhibited in the successful democratization, peacemaking, and post-
conflict regeneration of numerous countries throughout Eastern Europe and Latin America, such 
as in the breakup of Yugoslavia.  Thus, the effective involvement of civil society has proven to 
be a vital contributor to the development, stabilization, and democratization of various countries.  
 However, civil society organizations have yet to have this similarly effective role in 
conflict-ridden and post-conflict countries throughout the Middle East (Hawthorne 2004).  While 
there has been significant growth in the development and number of civil society organizations 
in the last decade throughout the Middle East, these groups have largely failed to become a 
driving force for democratization.  Some have consequently questioned why there has been such 
a great proliferation of these organizations throughout the region, yet they have been unable to 
make substantial progress in organizing the community for democratization (Hamid 2010, 
Bailer, Bodenstein, and Heinrich 2009). 
 While there are a wide variety of factors that impact the role of civil society organizations 
that range from socioeconomic development to international involvement, there is an undeniable 
link between the political structure and political culture of a country and the relative strength and 
success of its respective civil society network.  This is a result of the conditional relationship 
between political structure and political culture, in that the nature of the political structure 
provides the foundation for the necessary institutions, political behavior, and entry points for 
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civil society to flourish (Pateman 1971). 
 This thesis aims to explore the role of civil society in conflict and post-conflict areas of the 
Middle East, and the question as to whether the relationship between the political structure and 
political culture of a country is the primary determinant in the strength of civil society 
organizations.  This study will examine the factors that have been known to influence the 
strength of civil society organizations and analyze the theory regarding the conditional 
relationship between political structure and political culture and its corresponding impact on the 
role of civil society organizations.  
 In the following sections, I first provide an overview of the previous literature regarding 
the dynamic role of civil society and the factors that affect its relative strength and success.  I 
then present a theoretical perspective positing the relationship between the political structure and 
political structure to be the primary determinant of the strength of civil society organizations.  I 
explore this theory through the case studies of three Middle Eastern countries, namely Syria, 
Libya, and Tunisia.  Lastly, I conclude with remarks from these case studies and explore 
prospects for future research regarding the role of civil society organizations. 
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II. Literature Review 
 The role of civil society organizations in the stabilization and democratization of conflict 
and post-conflict ridden countries has been contested over the past several decades.  In the past, 
many have traditionally supported political or military solutions to international conflicts; 
however, others have come to advocate for the promotion of civil society organizations in recent 
decades and their sustainable impact on conflict-ridden areas (Serwer 2014, Dorner and List 
2012).  These scholars argue that civil society organizations provide a lasting and grassroots 
approach to conflict management and resolution, and ultimately could play an invaluable role in 
both stabilization and democratization. 
 According to Dorner and List, the answer to dealing with prolonged conflict lies at the 
heart of organized civil society (2012).  They contend that the conflict dimension of civil society 
is either downplayed or inadequately addressed in the analysis of current political processes and 
armed conflicts.  “Research should explore the wider issue of the integration and the impact of 
civil society in the political system and in society more broadly, and the extent to which the 
conditions in which civil society operates contribute to a peaceful dealing with conflicts and 
hinder or support an escalation of conflicts” (2012). 
 Other scholars have come to agree that it is necessary for greater international recognition 
of the role and prospective contributions of civil society organizations.  Fischer states that civil 
society cooperation with international organizations brings under-represented and marginalized 
issues to attention, while also making decision-making processes through the political system 
more transparent (2006).  The potential role of these organizations in stabilization and 
democratization is defined by their political independence, the flexibility of their mandates, their 
impartiality and high standards of credibility (2006). 
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 Van Tongeren detailed the vast abilities and strengths of these organizations, specifically 
including, “… a) function without being constrained by narrow mandates of foreign policy 
imperatives, b) achieve access to areas inaccessible to official actors, c) talk to several parties 
without losing their credibility, d) deal directly with grassroots populations, e) operate in 
confidentiality without media, parliamentary or public scrutiny, f) take the greatest risks, given 
their public advocacy and social-justice agendas, g) effectively network, given their longstanding 
relationships, built on trust, with civil society in the conflict zones, h) draw upon public opinion 
to galvanize political will to focus on a longer-term perspective than governments are able to…” 
(1998). 
These organizations have many capabilities and have also played a pivotal role in conflict 
prevention, peacemaking, and post-conflict regeneration, which has ultimately had a sustainable 
impact on the rebuilding of society, namely in the breakup of Yugoslavia (Serwer 2014).  Civil 
society organizations have allowed a variety of countries to flourish politically and socially in the 
past several decades, so much so that many attribute the transformation of the economic and 
political system in the Balkans to the post-conflict regeneration and strength of civil society 
organizations (Fischer 2006).  Through the cooperation and coordination of many civil society 
organizations, these countries have been able to create sustainable progress that extends on a 
much broader scale, and in these cases, the impact of civil society had a more influential and 
successful role in the rebuilding of society than international intervention efforts did. 
Civil society organizations have come to gain experience in responding to the greatest 
needs of the people in the absence of the government or in the face of great conflict.  They also 
facilitate the pursuit of individual interests and opportunities, which range from the political to 
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economic to social spheres.  Many therefore argue that they have played a dynamic, if not 
instrumental, role in past examples of conflict resolution in various areas of the world, which has 
ultimately garnered increasing levels of interest and recognition in regards to the potential 
strength and success of civil society engagement. 
 
Measuring the Role of Civil Society 
With the recent heightened attention on the impact of civil society, the CIVICUS Civil 
Society project was initiated in last two decades as a means to assess the role of civil society on 
an international scale and observe the relative strength of these organizations in various countries 
and regions.  The project defines civil society as the arena, outside of the family, the state, and 
the market where people associate to advance common interests, and it uses a Civil Society 
Index (CSI) to assess the strength of civil society organizations and their connection to processes 
that strengthen civil society (Dorner and List 2012).  The project recognizes that the 
understanding of civil society is still limited and there is little empirical knowledge on the direct 
impact of civil society organizations; thus, the project was created to measure the crucial aspects 
of the existing social and political systems, specifically in regards to the state of governance and 
social and political development (Bailer 2009).   
This study of the role of civil society organizations has been applied to specific countries 
characterized by prominent civil society organizations that coordinate vital government, 
business, and developmental aspects of society (Bailer 2009).  The index has been implemented 
in regards to the strength of civil society based upon four criteria for each respective country.  
These include the structure of civil society, the external environment in which civil society exists 
and functions, the values practiced and promoted in the civil society arena, and lastly the impact 
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of activities pursued by civil society actors (Bailer 2009).  Each of these dimensions is used to 
score the strength of civil society to create a diamond framework as a means to rank different 
countries in terms of structure, environment, values, and impact. 
Through the CIVICUS study, there has been greater knowledge acquired regarding the 
state of civil society globally and the linkages and networks between civil society stakeholders.  
It has laid the foundation to examine the structure, values, environment, and impact of civil 
society organizations on a global scale, which has ultimately provided information regarding the 
breadth and depth of citizen participation, the legal environment and culture, and state-civil 
society relations.  This has set a basis for examining the necessary requirements and framework 
for civil society organizations to grow and thrive, namely in demonstrating the significance of 
the principles of democracy and transparency, as well as accessibility to influence public policy 
and hold state and private corporations accountable (Bailer 2009). 
 
Civil Society in the Middle East 
However, this CIVICUS index has been applied to a specific set of countries in which 
quantifiable information was available to observe the most crucial factors and the necessary 
framework determining the strength of civil society.  In terms of the Middle East, the region as a 
whole lacks significant information on the recent growth of civil society organizations and thus 
their role in stabilization and democratization, namely as much of the region continues to 
struggle with instability and authoritarian regimes.  These countries score low on the CIVICUS 
scale in terms of socioeconomic modernization and democratic governance while also falling 
significantly behind in terms of a cohesive global civil society in comparison to many other 
regions (Bailer 2009).   
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Therefore, there is little information on the strength and role of civil society organizations 
in specific countries in the Middle East not solely throughout the CIVICUS project, but also in 
modern studies that examine the specific elements that differentiate the insignificant role of civil 
society in this region from the successful role of civil society organizations in other areas of the 
world, such as Eastern Europe. 
 
Factors that Influence the Role of Civil Society 
After the launching of the CIVICUS study and the development of a framework that 
detailed the necessary conditions and environment for a successful role of civil society, a variety 
of societal and political factors have come to be contested in their impact on the strength of civil 
society organizations on an international scale.  Over the last two decades, these factors have 
received greater attention and studies have arisen to examine the significance of each of these 
individual factors in both the micro and macro political processes.  This has ultimately expanded 
into a debate over which of these existing factors is most influential in determining the role of 
civil society and how this relates to the differing successes of civil society in various regions 
throughout the world (Bailer 2009). 
 One theoretical approach is the role of socioeconomic development in the strength of 
civil society organizations and their impact on democratization.  The classical modernization 
theory states that the higher the degree of socioeconomic development, the stronger the potential 
impact for civil society in that country (Bailer 2009).  This has been postulated due to the theory 
that development results in middle class growth and social integration, which would then in turn 
yield a favorable environment for civil society to grow and flourish.  This environment allows 
for the space and accessibility necessary for these organizations to enhance their involvement in 
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the political, economic, and cultural spheres.  Thus, some scholars have come to argue that 
socioeconomic development is the primary factor and prerequisite for a flourishing democracy 
(Lipset 1959). 
 A second theory involves the role of the existing political culture of a country.  This 
directly correlates to the strength of civil society because the political culture encompasses 
national traditions and cultural legacies, as well as the sociopolitical traditions and social 
interaction in society (Bailer 2009).  The nature of the political culture establishes the framework 
that could either support or obstruct the role of civil society in stabilization and democratization.  
According to Putnam, this theory is known as the “bottom-up” approach for historical patterns of 
civic engagement, namely in that the role of civil society is determined from the underlying 
political culture developed by the population (1995). 
 Others argue the contrary in that the political structure and existing political institutions 
are the primary factors in determining the impact of civil society organizations (Bailer 2009).  
This theory is instead known as the “top-down” approach and contends that the key 
characteristics of a country’s political structure are crucial determinants on the role of civil 
society organizations (Skocpol and Fiorina 1999).  The current political environment, 
specifically the democratic quality, the effectiveness of the state, and the strength of the rule of 
law are direct contributors to the growth of civil society (Hadenius and Uggla 1996).  These 
factors provide essential enabling conditions for the successful and sustainable role of civil 
society organizations. 
 Others have come to recognize the impact of international influences in determining the 
strength of civil society (Bailer 2009).   They argue that the current international events and 
processes throughout the world result in a circulation of dominant cultural frames, customs, and 
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resources, which greatly influence the development of civil society (Schofer and Longhofer 
1999).  These dynamics significantly affect the number of international non-governmental 
organizations present in a country, which is a strong indicator of how civil society organizations 
operate both within the respective country and in the context of the international aid system 
(Bailer 2009). 
Thus, it is still contested as to which factor in the political, economic, and social spheres 
is the most influential determinant of the relative strength and effectiveness of civil society 
organizations.  While scholars have examined these factors and competing hypotheses in 
isolation from each other, little has been researched in the context of the conditional relationship 
between individual factors, namely in the association between the existing political structure and 
the consequent political culture that influences the role and strength of civil society organization 
in the Middle East. 
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III. Theory 
 The environment in which civil society organizations assist in the stabilization and 
democratization processes is contingent upon the political structure and consequent political 
culture of a country.  There is an inherent relationship between both the political structure and 
political culture, which lays the foundation for the development and potential strength of civil 
society organizations. 
 The political structure determines the way in which a government is run and refers to the 
patterns of interaction within a political system and the regulations, laws, and norms present.  
This domain ultimately determines the development of institutions and the political climate, 
which ultimately allows for the norms, roles, practices, relationships, and competencies in 
society.  It opens up the necessary space for socialization, association, and organized forms of 
communication (Cohen 1994).   
 This structure ultimately establishes the groundwork for the role of the corresponding 
political culture, which encompasses the set of attitudes and practices held by a people that 
shapes their political behavior (Cohen 1994).  It is determined through the leadership and nature 
of the regime and has come to be categorized as the connecting link between micro and macro 
politics (Pateman 1971). 
 The relationship between political structure and the political culture has come to be 
instrumental to the process of political stability and change (Pateman 1971).  As political 
scientists have placed a greater emphasis on the role of civil society organizations, many have 
come to determine that the success and strength of civil society is largely dependent on the way 
that a country’s government rules over its people and how the social sphere has developed 
(Dorner and List 2012, Fischer 2006).   Thus, a society in which the political structure fosters the 
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enhancement of action-orienting norms and political projects supports a corresponding political 
culture that can expand the existing rights, democratic institutions, social solidarity, and justice 
of a country (Cohen 1994).   
 Civil society organizations are the intervening variables that allow for this stabilization to 
occur and support the effective development of civil-state relations.  Democratic processes rely 
on the strength of new autonomous forms of discourse, associations, and solidarity, which are the 
primary elements of civil society (Cohen 1994).  It can thus be determined that the initial 
political structure of a state will help determine its respective process of stabilization through 
civil society organizations due to the fact that the political structure will determine the ability of 
civil society to work with and enhance the existing political culture and institutions present 
(Cohen 1994). 
 A previous lack of institutions and civil society organizations as a result of authoritarian 
regimes has been known to greatly influence this conditional relationship between the political 
structure and political culture, with the role of civil society organizations as the independent 
variable and democratization and stabilization as the dependent variable.  This is incredibly 
relevant in the Middle East, especially in the period after the Arab Spring in which several 
countries overthrew authoritarian dictators and still remain in the process of rebuilding the 
political, social, and economic spheres of the respective countries.  Civil society organizations 
have been limited in their impact and influence in these countries due to the internal 
fragmentation, lack of coordination, and ongoing in stability and warfare (Fischer 2006).  This 
has ultimately limited democratization and stabilization to impact small-scale and independent 
change, greatly impacting the connection between civil society and government and societal 
relations. 
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 The process of the institutionalization of discourses of stabilization and democratization is 
possible only on the grounds of modern civil society, which Cohen defines as the sphere of 
social interaction between economy and state, composed above all of the intimate sphere, the 
sphere of associations, social movements and forms of public communication (1994).  “Modern 
civil society is created through forms of self-constitutions and self-mobilization.  It is 
institutionalized and generalized through laws, and especially subjective rights, that stabilize 
social differentiation” (1994).  Thus, the relationships among societal plurality, individual 
autonomy, social movements, and a liberal, democratic political system are dependent on the 
existing political culture and structure present as a means to lay the foundation for 
communicative action and social change. 
 Some political scientists have come to argue that this structure of the political system is the 
primary factor that independently shapes the manner in which civil society organizations act 
(Skocpol and Fiorina 1999, Bailer 2009).  This is namely due to the barrier to entry with greater 
restrictions and regulations on the activities and funding sources of civil society organizations 
that is characteristic of authoritarian or tyrannical regimes (Deane 2013).  A lack of support from 
governments, specifically in cases where civil society organizations have failed to arise and have 
a vital impact on the democratization of respective countries, is said to correlate to the progress 
of civil society on both a political and institutional level.   
 On the other hand, in a political structure with a legitimate distribution of power, such as in 
a strong parliamentary system of government, civil society organizations are more likely to be 
viewed as agents who can inform the government by articulating the preferences of civil society 
(Deane 2013).  Therefore, there are greater access points and opportunities for civil society 
organizations not only to multiply in numbers, but also to enhance public participation and 
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interest within the political and social spheres. 
 
Dominant Factors that Influence the Strength of Civil Society 
 There are varying theories in political science and conflict resolution as to which factor 
independently is the most dominant in affecting the strength and effectiveness of civil society 
organizations (Cohen 1994, Bailer 2009).  However, there are currently few theories present that 
detail the dynamic correlation in how these factors influence each other, and ultimately how this 
resulting relationship influences the role and strength of civil society.   
In particular, the factor encompassing the political culture of a country focuses on the 
cultural institutions and legacies present as a means of social interaction and a foundation for the 
development of a vibrant civil society (Bailer 2009).  However, this theory is not compared in 
relation to other factors such as the existing political structure, specifically in comparing cases in 
which the transformation of the political structure and regime type of certain countries had a 
direct impact on the strength of civil society.  In these cases, civil society organizations have 
been strengthened as a result of the political climate and institutions that have developed through 
the opening of a supportive political culture.   
On the other hand, the role of civil society has yet to play a direct role in the stabilization 
of countries that suffer from an existing authoritarian political structure or an absence of a 
legitimate political system, as well as the consequential lack of institutions and civic sphere 
present.  This is a result of the fact that civil society organizations necessitate the means and 
accessibility to influence civic-state relations and public participation, which is not possible 
under the nature of the political structure and culture of many conflict and post-conflict ridden 
countries. 
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Conditional Relationship between Political Structure and Political Culture 
While it is clear that there is an inherent relationship between the political structure and 
political culture categorizations, these factors that influence the strength of civil society have 
rarely been compared in the context of each other in specific case studies.  They have rather been 
observed independently and in isolation from each other, which has yielded inconclusive results 
on an international scale and ultimately has overlooked the vital connection that leads to a strong 
civil society.  Thus, my hypothesis predicts that the relationship between the political structure 
and the political culture of a country is the primary determinant in the strength and effectiveness 
of civil society due to the consequent environment that provides the basis for civil society to 
grow and thrive. 
 Based upon this argument, I will explore this conditional relationship between political 
structure and political culture that is essential for social change in the context of post-Arab 
Spring Middle Eastern countries, specifically in the case studies of Syria, Libya, and Tunisia.  
This study will explore the evolution of the political structures in each of these cases and the 
consequent development of either a supportive or obstructive political culture.  It will then 
examine how the nature of the political culture has influenced the relative growth and strength of 
civil society organizations and it will ultimately test how the conjunction of these factors is the 
primary determinant of the role of civil society. 
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IV. Case Study Selection 
 This study will test the conditional relationship between political structure and the 
consequent political culture of a country in serving as the primary determinant of the strength of 
civil society organizations in stabilization and democratization.  It will examine this relationship 
through a case study analysis of the role of civil society organizations in three post-Arab Spring 
countries in the Middle East: Syria, Libya, and Tunisia.  These cases were selected as a result of 
the differing outcomes of the Arab Spring demonstrations in the attempts to oust each country’s 
respective authoritarian regime, and how this shift in political structure, or lack thereof, has 
influenced the role of civil society organizations in each respective country.  
 This study will first examine the two cases in which civil society organizations have been 
unable to play a direct role in the stabilization and democratization processes, which include 
Syria and Libya.  In regards to Syria, it will observe how the current political structure has 
greatly impeded the role and strength of civil society due to the ongoing civil warfare and severe 
fragmentation within the country.  The nature of President Assad’s authoritarian regime has 
dominated the political system and thus laid the foundation for the country’s political culture.  
This study will then analyze how this dependent relationship has inevitably impacted the role of 
civil society organizations and inhibited their success over the years following their rise during 
the Arab Spring demonstrations. 
 In regards to the case of Libya, this study will observe the hindered role of civil society 
organizations as a result of the lack of a legitimate and authoritative political structure and 
consequent political culture. Although dictator Muammar Gaddafi was overthrown in 2011, 
Libya continues to suffer from a massive lack of political and social institutions and ongoing 
civil unrest and militia warfare.  This study will consequently examine how Libyan civil society 
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organizations have struggled to influence the population and have a direct role in the stabilization 
and democratization of the country due to the lack of a legitimate political structure and the 
contingent political culture that has developed. 
 This study will lastly explore a case study example in which civil society organizations 
have played a vital role in the stabilization and democratization of the country, namely in 
Tunisia.  Since Tunisia first ignited the wave of Arab Spring protests in 2011, the country has 
successfully overthrown the authoritarian regime and has paved a path to democratization in 
contrast to the majority of Arab Spring states. This successful transition in political structure has 
allowed for a supportive and favorable political culture to develop, which has fostered an evident 
strength and effectiveness for civil society, specifically through the recent parliamentary 
elections and ongoing attempts to rebuild the political, social, and economic systems.  This study 
will analyze this successful case in which civil society organizations have played an incredibly 
demonstrative role, which was largely possible due to the nature of the political culture that was 
contingent on the shift in political structure after 2011. 
 Thus, this study will test the relationship between the political structure and political 
culture of these respective countries in the Middle East as the primary factor in determining the 
strength of civil society and its role in the democratization and stabilization of the post-conflict 
and conflict-ridden countries.  The following three case study examples will observe the 
importance of this conditional relationship within each country in influencing the role and 
strength of civil society in post-Arab Spring countries throughout the Middle East.   
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The Case of Syrian Civil Society 
The Syrian conflict has waged for over three years and has resulted in unprecedented levels 
of violence, destruction, and fatalities. While the international community has attempted to assist 
in facilitating peace talks and humanitarian aid, Syrians have responded within their own country 
through the creation of hundreds of independent civil society organizations that have sprung up 
since the start of the civil war.  They have multiplied over the past several years to address the 
most pressing needs of the shattered Syrian state, ranging in purpose from civilian opposition 
goals to humanitarian aid services for the victims of the conflict (Serwer 2014).  However, while 
they have ameliorated various aspects of the conflict on a smaller-scale, these Syrian civil 
society organizations have been greatly hindered by the oppressive nature of the country’s 
political structure, as well as a severe lack of communication and resources, which has ultimately 
blocked any significant progress towards democratization. 
 
Role of Civil Society prior to the Arab Spring  
Prior to the start of the demonstrations and civil conflict in 2011, the Syrian public sought an 
avenue to protest the despotic Assad family rule and acquire a political voice (Hokayem 2013).  
They had long struggled with a great lack of participation and representation on an individual 
level throughout the country, which had been ingrained in Syrian society for several decades.  
This growing dissatisfaction was exacerbated by declining economic circumstances and rising 
levels of unemployment, as well as an absence of public organizations and institutions that 
typically serve to promote stability and civic involvement (Gelvin 2012).  
As a result of this environment, few Syrian civil society groups existed throughout both 
Hafez al-Assad and Bashar al-Assad’s authoritarian rule prior to 2011, and those that existed 
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were strictly controlled and monitored by the regime (Ahmado 2013).  These organizations were 
not able to effectively operate under the authoritarian political structure of the country and were 
likewise unable to provide the impetus for the Syrian people to demand social change. 
 
Development of Civil Society throughout the Arab Spring 
 However, with the spark of the Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt in January of 2011 and 
the wave of uprisings sweeping the region, Syrians came together to protest Assad’s 
authoritarian regime and advocate for a new and representative nation through the awakening of 
civil society.   Syrian lawyers, politicians, activists, and youth joined together to call for 
democratic change and utilize civil society organizations to advocate for voices that had long 
been silenced (Ahmado 2013).  They peacefully demanded their own representative government 
through grassroots and student-led movements and came to develop a leadership structure on 
both a local and statewide level facilitated by civil society organizations.  Syrian journalist, 
blogger, and activist Nisan Ahmado recounts, “the coordinators worked to teach people the 
culture of peaceful struggle, prepared signs and songs for the protests, delivered the aspirations 
of the people inside and outside the country via social media, worked closely with Syrian civil 
society groups established abroad to support those who are inside, and demanded the repeal of 
decades-long emergency law banning demonstrations…” (2013).  
The developing network of civil society organizations carried the promise of a progressive 
and democratic Syria in the following months of the demonstrations.  However, while this time 
was marked by the desire for peaceful change and institutional form for the Syrian people, the 
accelerating collaboration posed a great threat to Assad’s regime and ultimately was countered 
by brutal force with no consideration for basic human or political rights (Hokayem 2013). 
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The violent attacks and acts of repression prompted an eventual shift to an armed revolution 
between Assad’s regime and the Syrian opposition in the months following the initial 
demonstrations (Gelvin 2012).  This ultimately forced civil society organizations to shift from 
forming public coalitions to working underground and reforming their structures and operations.  
They became required to continue their work and missions in a far less visible tone and adapt 
their activity to the severe lack of resources, forms of communication, and horrific oppression of 
the regime (Brandenburg 2014). 
 
Development of Syrian Civil Society Organizations throughout the Ongoing Civil War 
These civil society organizations have now adapted their purpose and strategies as the 
conflict has evolved over the past four years and as the revolution has changed in nature 
according to President Bashar al-Assad’s violent rule.  Many of these groups are not politically 
affiliated and have chosen to address their priorities in a neutral and independent manner in order 
to maintain their own mission (Brandenburg 2014).  They have come to learn vital lessons from 
likeminded organizations and refine their approaches to operate more efficiently despite the 
significant hardships they face in terms of access to resources and the impending threat of 
violence and retaliation. 
Syrian civil society organizations have also specialized in their intended goals and services 
since the initial demonstrations in 2011.  These groups now vary in categorization from civilian 
opposition groups to human rights organizations to humanitarian aid and specialized services 
associations. 
 
Civilian Opposition Groups 
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In response to President Assad’s increasingly despotic and violent actions, the number of 
civilian opposition groups dramatically increased since the uprisings in 2011 (Serwer 2014).  
This form of civil society organizations include groups such as Building the Syrian State, the 
Syriac Union Party, and the Coalition of Forces for Peaceful Change, all of which work for a 
nonviolent, civil democratic state impartial towards all ideologies and doctrines.  
These groups advocate for equality through fundamental democratic change, dialogue, and 
national reconciliation (Carnegie 2012). Over the past several years, they have openly opposed 
Assad’s regime and have sought to establish an inclusive political process as a means to end the 
conflict.  These civilian opposition organizations are known to operate both inside and outside of 
regime territory and are active on social media and other forms of communication to gain 
followers and spread awareness.  
 
Human Rights Organizations 
Other civil society groups are more centered on human rights, such as the Damascus Center 
for Human Rights Studies, the Syrian Human Rights Organization, and the Centre for Syrian 
Freedoms.  These organizations call for upholding the inalienable human rights of all Syrians 
and equality in front of the law, rather than focusing solely on active participation and 
representation in political activities (Serwer 2014). They have worked to document crimes 
against humanity within Syria, as well as issue statements, publications, and reports on human 
rights violations throughout the conflict (Damascus Center 2014, Watan 2014).  Their visions 
focus on informing Syrian citizens of their rights and building a documented foundation for this 
data in order to promote human rights activism.  Through these documented reports, many civil 
society organizations, such as the Damascus Center and the Centre for Syrian Freedoms, have 
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now proposed bills that fit with internationally agreed upon human rights legislations (Damascus 
Center 2014). 
 
Humanitarian Aid Organizations 
 There also has been a significant rise in the number of humanitarian aid oriented civil 
society organizations as the violence and fatalities have accelerated in Syria with each passing 
year.  Every Syrian, Najda Now, Syria Charity, and many others work to provide relief and 
social services for civilians throughout the country regardless of race, ethnicity, or religion. 
These organizations work both within Syria and in the surrounding region in order to secure 
daily necessities and shelter for those affected by the loss of their families and homes (Daleel 
Madani 2014).   
Many of these Syrian humanitarian groups have also developed more specialized 
philanthropic goals, namely for services that address women’s or children’s needs (Serwer 
2014).  Bas al Karama is an organization known to provide social and psychological services for 
children who have been displaced as refugees throughout the conflict, while Darayya’s Free 
Women is an example of an organization that promotes female nonviolent involvement in the 
revolution and support for those in need of food, shelter, and assistance (Zaitouneh 2012). 
 Many of these humanitarian civil society organizations also partner with international 
organizations that are located outside of Syria, such as Every Syrian. These organizations have 
worked to achieve strategic partnerships with various international institutions and have pursued 
international funding to rebuild Syrian homes and businesses.  Every Syrian in particular has 
become a well-known organization that provides unconditional aid to the most urgent and critical 
cases across Syria regardless of race, religion, ethnicity or politics (Every Syrian 2014).  One of 
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its primary goals is to “help people help themselves,” emphasizing a level of sustainability in 
providing aid and necessary resources (2014). Every Syrian and other likewise civil society 
organizations seek to not only provide individuals and small businesses with the necessary 
funding to restart their businesses and spark employment, but also to instill a level of societal 
sustainability.  They have attempted to consolidate resources and strategies on an international 
level as a means to provide aid to victims and reestablish civil society and institutions as 
effectively as possible. 
 
Impact and Limited Capabilities of Syrian Civil Society Organizations 
This wide variety of civil society organizations in Syria has played an important role in the 
country’s evolution and in providing humanitarian aid in the face of the conflict (Serwer 2014).  
They have created a growing network alongside traditional aid agencies both inside and outside 
of the country over the past several years; however, these organizations remain severely limited 
in development and success as a result of the existing authoritarian regime and the ongoing 
instability that plagues the country. 
Syrian civil society organizations have been unable to fully execute their respective missions 
with President Assad still in power due to their inability to obtain the necessary resources, 
support, and specialized staff members (Brandenburg 2014).  Funding and supplies are greatly 
limited for these groups and methods of communication and transportation are greatly restricted.  
Many of these organizations have also been forced to work underground due to the threats and 
fear of brutal retaliation on behalf of Assad’s security apparatus, making it exceedingly 
challenging to operate at a functional and effective level.  
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As a result of this absence of a stable and cohesive political structure, Syrian civil society 
organizations have been hindered by high levels of fragmentation and a lack of coordination over 
the past several years (Brandenburg 2014).  The country remains divided between regime-
controlled territory and opposition-controlled territory, and likeminded civil society 
organizations that range from civilian opposition groups to humanitarian aid organizations are 
unable to communicate with each other to facilitate institutional reform on both local and state-
wide levels (Ruiz de Elvira 2013). 
 
Exclusion of Syrian Civil Society on International Stage 
 The limited role of Syrian civil society organizations has further been obstructed after 
their exclusion from the Geneva II Middle East peace conference facilitated by the United 
Nations in 2014 (Brandenburg 2014).  This conference aimed at ending the Syrian conflict was 
held exclusively between Assad’s regime and the opposition, and civil society organizations that 
ranged from civilian opposition groups to humanitarian aid agencies were neither allowed to 
have an influential voice nor detail their extensive role in addressing the needs of Syrians on the 
ground over the past several years (Atassi 2014).  While the conference sought to establish a 
transitional government and initiate a process towards a new Syrian republic, it was largely 
unsuccessful in ameliorating the crisis and providing a means for stabilization. 
Some find great fault in this exclusion of civil society organizations throughout Geneva II 
because a comprehensive peace agreement cannot be sustained without the help and existence of 
these organizations.  Wael Sawah, Executive Director of the USIP- led Day After Association in 
Syria, argued, “Civil society is what guarantees the sustainability of any agreement.  Civil 
society has been responding to Syrians’ needs and raising awareness about the situation in Syria 
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from the beginning of the revolution. Civil society played a role in the media, conveying to the 
world what was happening in Syria; took photos and published them to the entire world; helped 
refugees and those displaced; defended human rights; documented violations against human 
rights and crimes against humanity, all while the regime was killing people and the opposition 
was fighting over political positions. In order to sustain any agreement from Geneva, the world 
needs civil society to be involved” (Brandenburg 2014).  
 
Necessity of the Role of Syrian Civil Society   
Consequently, many have come to recognize the vital contributions of Syrian civil society in 
rebuilding the political, economic, and social spheres of the country from the ground up (Serwer 
2014, Ruiz de Elvira 2013).  These advocates commend the role that civil society organizations 
have played thus far and the significant experience and knowledge they have attained in 
addressing the ongoing conflict.   
Stimson Center Expert Mona Yacoubian built upon this recognition of civil society in her 
report “Lessons Learned for Stabilization in Syria” and emphasized the vital incorporation of 
local politics in future efforts (2014).  She highlighted the essential involvement that civil society 
organizations have played in greater community-level mapping in Syria and their fundamental 
role in transitioning the country from an authoritarian political structure on a local and small-
scale level.  It is therefore necessary for the long-term stabilization and democratization of Syria 
to take an integrated approach and incorporate peace-building, security, and development 
principles undertaken by local actors, namely by the wide array of developing civil society 
organizations (2014).   
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Role of Syrian Political Structure and Culture  
While many activists, scholars, and political leaders have come to acclaim the potential role 
of Syrian civil society organizations in the stabilization of the country, these groups remain 
severely hindered by the current state of the country.  Syria has become a war-torn and oppressed 
land that continuously struggles with human rights violations, a growing refugee problem, and 
brutal acts of oppression carried out by the regime still in power.  While there are many factors 
that affect the success and impact of Syrian civil society organizations, the linkage between the 
existing authoritarian political structure and political culture in Syria has dominantly impacted, 
and more specifically hindered, the role and strength of these organizations.   
The existing authoritarian political structure under President Assad has played a direct role in 
the lack of success of Syrian civil society organizations in the stabilization and democratization 
of the country.  Assad’s despotic and increasingly brutal regime has not only dominated the 
political structure of the country, but also laid the foundation for the limited and fragmented role 
of the corresponding political culture and institutions.  This conditional relationship between the 
oppression of the political structure and the corresponding political culture present for civil 
society organizations to work within has inevitably proven to be the primary determinant in the 
strength and effectiveness, or lack thereof, of Syrian civil society. 
 
Impact of an Authoritarian Political Structure on Civil Society 
Since President Bashar al-Assad’s assumption of power in 2000 after the death of his father, 
he has held virtually all power as the head of state and chief executive officer of the government, 
as well as the commander in chief of the armed forces (Gelvin 2012).  This tradition of 
authoritarianism was likewise present during the repressive regime of Hafez al-Assad from 1971 
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to 2000, which has further established a deeply rooted sense of authoritarian dominance and lack 
of political rights and participation among the Syrian population.  
However, the true nature of the Assad regime was revealed after the start of the Arab Spring 
in 2011, in which President Assad retaliated with ruthless and violent measures against many 
students and demonstrators that had come together to peacefully protest the ongoing regime 
(Gelvin 2012).  These initial clashes developed into an atrocious civil war over the past four 
years, in which hundreds of thousands of people have been killed in merciless acts of violence 
with no imminent prediction of the toppling of the regime. 
The political structure of Syria has come to be characterized by the authoritarian dominance 
of the executive, as well as the unprecedented levels of brutal and indiscriminate violence over 
the past several years.  This existing system has confined power solely in the hands of Assad’s 
executive and has utilized fear and violence to avert any forms of competition or opposition to 
the regime.  The structure of this political system has also posed countless barriers to entry for 
organizations and institutions, which has influenced the political culture of the country and 
ultimately deterred the advancement of Syrian civil society. 
   
Conditional Relationship between Political Structure and Political Culture 
As a result of the relationship between the authoritarian political structure that exists within 
Syria and its impact on the political culture, Syrian civil society groups have been significantly 
hindered in their role in the stabilization and democratization of the country.  Repression and 
despotism have long been ingrained in the Syrian political structure, which has inevitably 
determined the characteristics of the political culture and set of attitudes and practices held by 
the population.   
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Due to the oppressive regime’s struggle to maintain complete power, as well as the ongoing 
warfare waged on civilians and the Syrian opposition, there is a great disconnect between the 
political structure of the country and the grassroots development of civil society organizations 
and institutions.  Civil society groups have not been able to effectively rise up and unite in 
mission and common goals because the political sphere has long been dominated by the 
repressive regime.  They have been forced to work underground and are unable to collaborate in 
a way to promote the exchange of various political perspectives and encourage dialogue and 
political participation due to the existing political culture. 
 As a result of the relationship between political structure and political culture, civil 
society inherently cannot make the effective and substantial changes necessary for stabilization 
and democratization under a despotic or authoritarian political structure.  This type of regime 
cannot produce the supportive political culture necessary for enhanced civil society involvement 
and engagement, namely though increased accessibility and fewer restrictions and regulations for 
these organizations.   
This directly relates to the absence and limitations of Syrian civil society over the past 
decades and why these organizations have not been able to assume a more direct role in fostering 
democratic change.  Thus, the connection between the political structure of Assad’s highly 
oppressive and authoritarian regime and the consequent repercussions on the country’s political 
culture remains the primary factor in determining the relative strength and role of civil society 
organizations. 
 
Conclusions 
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The Syrian civil war has persisted for four horrific years and has taken a brutal toll on the 
lives of the population.  The Syrian people have withstood the horrors of an oppressive regime, 
continuous human rights violations, a lack of basic human necessities, and a complete absence of 
involvement in the political arena.  President Assad’s despotic regime has shown no mercy or 
respect for inherent human rights and therefore has left the Syrian people to fend for themselves 
with very limited resources and no governmental assistance. 
Syrian civil society organizations have thus come to assume this responsibility and have 
worked to provide the necessary services and resources to the ailing population.   They have 
evolved over the past four years as the conflict has changed in nature and have come to learn 
vital lessons and strategies from the extensive network of civil society organizations that has 
developed over the past several years (Brandenburg 2014).  This wide array of organizations 
have unified under the demand for political and social change, ranging in concentration from 
civilian opposition groups to humanitarian aid agencies to human rights centers. 
While these organizations have engaged in significant efforts to ameliorate the conflict, they 
have been severely restricted in capacity as a result of the political structure and ongoing civil 
warfare.  These groups have endured high levels of fragmentation and a lack or coordination due 
to the hostility of the regime and the inability to work above ground. 
These limitations in the role of civil society are a result of the authoritarian political structure 
of the country and the consequent political culture.  Assad’s despotic regime has not only 
dominated the political structure of the country, but it also has laid the foundation for the limited 
and fragmented role of the corresponding political culture and institutions.  This has provided 
minimal space for civil society organizations to truly bring about political and social change as a 
result of the oppression of the political system and the ongoing instability and violence.  This 
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confirms the prevailing significance of the relationship between the political structure and 
political culture of a state, specifically in that an authoritarian political structure does not provide 
the necessary involvement and supporting political culture to facilitate the successful impact of 
civil society organizations. 
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The Case of Libyan Civil Society 
With the onset of the Arab Spring in Egypt and Tunisia in early 2011, Libya joined its North 
African neighbors in popular demonstrations over the political corruption and a lack of 
representation under dictator Muammar Qaddafi.  After four decades of a regime plagued by 
deteriorating economic conditions, nepotism, and tyranny, Libyans came together not only to 
overthrow the existing authoritarian government, but also to rebuild the political, economic, and 
social spheres from the ground up (Gelvin 2012).   
With the removal of Qaddafi, there became a political vacuum within the executive 
leadership, as well in the public sphere as a result of the complete barring of institutions and 
organizations under the previous regime.  Thus, a great outpouring of newly established civil 
society organizations swept the country in the following years as the political space opened and 
the potential role of civil society in Libya’s stabilization became clear (Foundation 2011).  
However, while these groups have arisen in large numbers to address the needs of Libyan 
society, they have had been greatly hindered in stabilizing the country and assisting in the path to 
democratization as a result of the significant void in the political framework and the ongoing 
civil unrest. 
 
Absence of Civil Society under the Qaddafi Regime 
Since Muammar al-Qaddafi’s assumption of power through a coup d’état in 1969, Libya’s 
political structure had been characterized by corruption, repression, and megalomania (Gelvin 
2012). Qaddafi governed according to theories of Islamic socialism and his own definition of 
direct democracy, which was specified in his “Third Universal Theory” in the Green Book in 
1977.  In this publication, Qaddafi necessitated the complete restructuring of the Libyan political, 
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economic, and civil spheres, in which all representative institutions and economic structures 
were demolished in order to establish a “rule by the masses” (Gelvin 2012). 
Due to this totalitarian rule, Libyan civil society was virtually nonexistent prior to Qaddafi’s 
eventual overthrow in 2011.  There were a very scarce number of regime-controlled 
organizations present that completely lacked independence, specifically in which nepotistic 
leaders and members of the security apparatus dictated activities to guarantee a commitment to 
the Green Book (Gelvin 2012).  Consequently, by the time of the Arab Spring, there was 
essentially a nonexistent framework of organizations and institutions that were severely 
restricted in all activities under the authoritarian political structure. 
 
Gradual Development of Civil Society throughout the Arab Spring 
The wave of demonstrations calling for an end to the Qaddafi regime commenced in Libya in 
February 2011 under a coalition of various groups entitled the National Conference for the 
Libyan Opposition (Gelvin 2012).  The coalition marked a significant step toward civil society 
collaboration within Libya and was united under increasing dissatisfaction with the dire political 
and economic conditions of the country.  However, its cooperative efforts and demonstrations 
were halted by the violent retaliation of the regime’s security forces, which prompted waves of 
protests throughout the country calling for an end to the tyrannical rule (Gelvin 2012).   
Violence and civil warfare ensued for several months, which not only garnered international 
attention and NATO involvement, but also a surge in civil society organizations aimed at 
addressing the most urgent needs, such as food, shelter, and medical attention, of the Libyan 
people (Petré 2014).  These groups centered around humanitarian aid ultimately initiated the 
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gradual development of Libyan civil society throughout the Arab Spring until Qaddafi was 
captured and killed in the fall of 2011.  
With the end of Qaddafi’s infamous regime, the main opposition group, the National 
Transitional Council, became the de facto government to fill the void in the Libyan political 
leadership.  The Council delivered a constitutional declaration the same month of Qaddafi’s 
death, laying the foundation for the transition of the country to a constitutional democracy with 
an elected government (Foundation 2011).  Libyans were optimistic in the following months 
regarding the future political transformation and network of civil society organizations, 
especially as an estimated sixty countries recognized the National Transitional Council as the 
new legitimate Libyan authority (Gritten 2011). 
 
Growth of Civil Society after Qaddafi’s Removal 
Alongside the initial political progress on behalf of the National Transitional Council, there 
was also significant growth for Libyan civil society organizations following Qaddafi’s removal. 
This development was facilitated by the termination of Qaddafi’s legislative framework 
regarding civil society organizations, which had previously required a lengthy and tedious 
process to register under the regime, as well as the mandatory incorporation of regime members 
in the leadership of the organization (IRIN 2011).  However, as soon as the regime was ousted in 
2011, the National Transitional Council worked to establish new laws of associations to facilitate 
greater entry points and opportunities for the involvement for these organizations (Foundation 
2011). 
By November 2011, 361 Libyan civil society organizations had been registered in Benghazi, 
and an additional 500 were registered in Tripoli (Foundation 2011).  This surge was not simply 
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due to the legal right to now establish civil society organizations, but also a result of the vital 
interest of the Libyan population to participate in the reconstruction and development process 
needed throughout the country (Petré 2014).  Some of these newly established organizations 
focused on issues that ranged from human rights protection and the promotion of civic 
participation, while others centered on the immediate care and services for victims of the 
ongoing civil conflict.   
These civil society organizations made significant efforts to fill the void in the Libyan 
political structure and establish a set of institutions in the country.  They assumed a direct role in 
mobilizing the urban and rural segments of society during the time of the demonstrations and 
have now adapted to assist the Libyan people with the significant humanitarian concerns due to 
the ongoing violence and stability (Foundation 2011).  These groups have not only maintained an 
active presence on the ground, but they have also arisen to fit the needs of society in the event 
that the acting government is either unable or unwilling to do so (IRIN 2011). 
With this growing number of registered civil society organizations within Libya, many 
groups have formed coalitions in order to create a national network of cooperative organizations.  
They have aimed to promote regional collaboration through conferences and workshops that 
engage in dialogue, training sessions, and shadowing throughout the region (Foundation 2011).  
Through these efforts, Libyan organizations have come to focus on three broad themes to best 
assist the population, which include women’s participation, youth education, and political and 
civic participation (Foundation 2011). 
 
Women’s Participation 
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After the removal of Qaddafi’s totalitarian regime, countless Libyan activists joined together 
in Benghazi and Tripoli to counter the restrictions on the political and social participation of 
women (Foundation 2011).  They sought to combat the deeply embedded traditional culture that 
had socially excluded women in the past, as well as advocate for the integrated role of women in 
the transitioning political system (Petré 2014).  In urban areas, significant progress has been 
made, in which Libyan women have attended trainings on various aspects of the constitution as a 
means to voice their demands for the new amendments. However, it is necessary for great strides 
to be taken outside of these urban centers, in which there is a deeply-rooted patriarchal culture to 
overcome (Foundation 2011). 
The Libyan Women Forum and Women for Libya, or W4L, are key examples of these efforts 
on behalf of civil society organizations to lobby for the meaningful inclusion of women in the 
transition process.  They were established in response to the absence of women in the National 
Transitional Council, and they remain active in society through writing letters to politicians and 
creating online petitions as a means for women to spread their mission.  Many of these groups 
have also formed coalitions and organized conferences to emphasize the necessity of female 
representation and empowerment within the political, social, and economic spheres of a new and 
democratic Libya (Petré 2014).   
 
Youth Education 
Libyan civil society organizations have also recognized the importance of laying the 
foundation for younger generations in regards to education, participation, and community 
involvement (Foundation 2011).  These groups have sought to include the youth in this process 
of democratization and integrate a “civic spirit” into the upbringing of Libya’s future 
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generations.  They emphasize instruction on topics that include democracy and political 
representation, namely as a result of the fact that Libya’s youth have never experienced a 
democratic election nor participated in civic engagement activities (Foundation 2011).  This 
specialized education seeks to provide the youth with a comprehensive understanding of their 
own political rights and freedoms, as well as rational expectations for future political and 
economic transformations. 
These youth empowerment organizations have arisen both within Libya and in a diaspora 
movement across the world to inspire younger generations of Libyans to take an active role in 
democratic change (Foundation 2011).  H20 is an example of a youth engagement organization 
established in September of 2011 that emphasizes the voices of Libyan youth and how to 
translate individual thoughts into propositions for the government.  The organization has 
partnered with a coalition of other similar youth-related organizations in initiating the project 
“Role of Youth in Drafting the Constitution” to involve children of all ages in understanding the 
creation of a new constitution (Libya CDGP 2013). 
 
Political and Civic Participation 
Lastly, the majority of civil society organizations have focused on political and civic 
participation within Libya’s transitional process.  This theme is viewed as an exceedingly 
pressing aspect of restructuring the political, economic, and civic spheres of the country, 
specifically due to Libya’s lack of experience in holding elections and establishing a new 
constitutional framework (Foundation 2011).  Civil society groups consequently organized 
behind the civic and political education of leaders, activists, and all facets of the population alike 
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so as to foster knowledge of democracy and human rights, as well as encourage greater political 
participation at this transformative time in the country’s history. 
Many of these organizations that concentrate on political and civic participation also 
promoted political party activities that ranged from drafting platforms to electoral campaigning 
and voter education (Foundation 2011).  Local civil society organizations organized instructive 
workshops regarding the necessity of these skillsets and the transformative impact this 
knowledge could have in the country’s political structure and culture.  The Foundation for the 
Future, a non-profit organization centered on supporting civil society in the Middle East, further 
emphasized, “This is especially accurate since transforming the political culture of a society who 
is deeply engrained by practices built-up over forty-two years is one of the most difficult aspects 
of any post-conflict transition.  A number of extensive civic education, and engagement 
awareness campaigns, at a local and national level are therefore essential components of any 
strategy to be implemented…” (2011). 
Many of these likeminded organizations unified under the coalition of the Libyan Civil 
Society Organization (LCSO) to focus on social justice, equal opportunity, and effective and 
sustainable civic participation (Tripoli Post 2011).  The alliance has remained incredibly active 
over the past several years and has worked to promote engagement and mobilization 
opportunities for all members of the population.  Thus, this coalition of civil society 
organizations has become the frontrunner in campaigning for civic participation, human rights, 
transparency, and the deepening of democratic values in Libya.   
 
Limitations of Libyan Civil Society 
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While the previous themes lie at the pinnacle of restructuring the political system and civic-
state relations, these civil society organizations have been greatly limited in their impact 
throughout the country.  Although they have served as the primary actors in fostering a sense of 
belonging and nationalism, many of these civil society organizations struggle with the absence of 
existing institutions and the ongoing political warfare and instability that continues to plague the 
country. 
Many of these civil society organizations are newly established and have struggled with a 
lack of experience and adoption of a clear agenda (Foundation 2011).  These groups require 
guidance and institutional support to determine organizational logistics, goals, and approaches; 
however, the political culture necessary to strengthen these organizations is only recently 
developing due to the absence of institutions prior to Qaddafi’s overthrow.  This has greatly 
impeded the ability of these groups to establish themselves and create coalitions as a result of the 
gradually emerging institutional support and political culture. 
These civil society organizations also suffer from a lack of sufficient funding to play an 
integrated role in the rebuilding of the country.  The majority of these groups rely solely on local 
donors and avoid foreign funding sources so as to retain their autonomy and preserve the 
intended mission of the organization (Foundation 2011).  However, there is very little local 
funding available due to the lack of economic opportunity and declining conditions, which has 
resulted in hampered capacities in the transition process for Libyan civil society organizations. 
 
Impact of the Ongoing Violence and Instability 
Lastly, Libyan organizations are also deterred as a result of the ongoing violence and 
instability that plague the country, as in the case of Syria.  Beginning in early 2012, clashes 
Zullo 39 
erupted between former rebel forces and the National Transitional Council over the lack of 
significant political and economic transformation after the end of Qaddafi’s rule (Gelvin 2012).  
Violence escalated over the following two years, culminating with the refusal of the General 
National Congress, the acting government, to disband despite the end of its mandate in 2014.  
Militia groups took to the streets and launched military assaults in Benghazi, which resulted in 
the resignation of the prime minister and further violence with the parliamentary elections in 
June 2014 (Al-Ghwell 2015). 
The past several years of violence and instability have greatly restricted the progress of civil 
society organizations in restructuring the country.  With the constant outbreaks of fighting and 
the deteriorating security system, Libyan organizations have had to resort to operating 
underground despite the provisions made to eliminate Qaddafi’s restrictive policy regarding civil 
society.  This instability has also forced these organizations to focus on the most urgent needs of 
the people during periods of civil unrest, namely in providing food, shelter, and medical supplies 
rather than concentrating on political participation, education, and empowerment.  Thus, the role 
of Libyan civil society in the democratization process has been hindered by the lack of security 
due to the void in a legitimate political structure and the urgency in addressing civilians’ basic 
needs. 
 
Role of Libyan Political Structure and Political Culture 
This variety of limitations that inhibit the success and strength of Libyan civil society 
organizations has greatly obstructed substantial progress and stabilization over the last several 
years.  The void in an authoritative and legitimate political structure after the removal of Qaddafi 
has played a direct role in the restrictions and challenges that Libyan civil society organizations 
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have come to face since 2011.  The absence of a stable political structure has inevitably resulted 
in ongoing instability and militia warfare, which has not only dominated the political system but 
also the nature of the political culture.  The conditional relationship between the lack of a defined 
and legitimate political structure and the consequent political culture defined by instability and 
violence has proven to determine the environment for Libyan civil society organizations to work 
within, which ultimately has defined their limited and largely insignificant role thus far. 
 
Impact of a Nonexistent Political Structure on Civil Society 
The oppression and dictatorship of Muammar Qaddafi stifled the establishment of an 
auxiliary and favorable environment for Libyan civil society over the course of several decades.  
These organizations were impeded by the lack of a constitution, stable political system, and civil 
institution system.  This authoritarian political structure also significantly influenced the political 
culture of the country, specifically in not allowing a place for the exchange of political opinions 
and perspectives or a framework for socialization and association.  However, with the capture 
and killing of Qaddafi in 2011, a space in the political structure opened and provided the 
necessary legal framework for civil society to engage in civil-state relations (Foundation 2011).   
While this change in political structure was initially considered promising for the country, 
neither a legitimate political system nor a redistribution of power has developed over the past 
several years since the Arab Spring.  Although the National Transitional Council first took action 
in assuming power in Libya in 2011 and successfully transitioned to the General National 
Congress, there now exists an absence of a defined political structure and authoritative leadership 
within the country.  The councils and transitional bodies have been unable to address the great 
void in power as the political structure began to lose its legitimacy in the eyes of the population 
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and civil warfare broke out.  Freedom House Director of Middle East and North Africa 
programs, Charles Dunne, remarked, “Libya’s problems go even deeper as armed groups 
continue to play a destabilizing role in Libya politics.  The crisis of security… has also been 
accompanied by a crisis of governance.  The General National Congress is widely seen as 
paralyzed and unresponsive and key issues have faced serious delays.  There are real costs to 
these crises…” (2013). 
 
Conditional Relationship between Political Structure and Political Culture 
With this forced removal of the regime in 2011, a power vacuum was created in Libya that 
allowed for a new executive leadership to take hold, as well as a legal framework for institutional 
reform.  However, this transition was hindered by the lack of an existing political culture and 
auxiliary organizations to support a stable and sustainable shift.  This ultimately forced Libyan 
civil society organizations to lay the foundation for a supportive political culture as they 
established themselves, which proved difficult in terms of experience, funding, and resources 
(Foundation 2011).   
This process was also exacerbated due to the ongoing unstable nature of the political 
structure even after Qaddafi’s removal.  Libya has come to be defined by a continuous state of 
civil unrest and armed warfare among militias due to the dominating power vacuum.  There is a 
growing state of political chaos accompanied by a deteriorating security system within the 
country, which has challenged the public confidence in government institutions (Dunne 2013).  
This crisis in security has had a significant impact on the developing political culture of the 
country, specifically in that there is a distrust of institutions, a crisis of confidence in the 
government, and consequently decreased political participation. 
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Thus, it is evident that a stable and supportive political culture had yet to develop in Libya, 
which ultimately is necessary to strengthen the role of civil society in the processes of 
stabilization and democratization.  President of the Benghazi Citizenship Forum for Democracy 
and Human Development, Aly Abuzaakouk acknowledged, “There is increasing skepticism of 
political parties attributed to forty-two years of indoctrination that partisan politics are 
undemocratic and treasonous. Forty-two years of indoctrination cannot be wiped out in one or 
two years.  Parties have not yet learned how to work together… the consensual culture of 
democracy has not yet taken root in Libya” (2013). 
This dependent linkage that has resulted in an adverse political culture has not only inhibited 
Libyan civil society organizations, but also those that have arisen in Syria since the Arab Spring.  
While both have been obstructed by the fragmentation of the political system and the continuous 
instability and warfare, these cases differ in the political structure and thus the causal role of civil 
society.  In the case of Libya, the population was able to overthrow the tyrannical ruler and had a 
limited political space for civil society to take an active role; however, the previous lack of 
institutions under Qaddafi and the ongoing void in a legitimate political structure has greatly 
impeded the strength and impact of developing civil society organizations.   
On the other hand, Syrian civil society organizations have not been able to oust President 
Assad’s oppressive regime and therefore do not have the necessary entry points in the legal 
framework to engage in civil-state relations.  These organizations are forced to work entirely 
underground without basic resources and methods of communication.  This has greatly restricted 
the political culture of the country, specifically in that it has failed to provide these organizations 
with the environment to develop and support the successful role of civil society in the 
stabilization and democratization processes.  
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There is an undeniable link between the political structure and political culture of a country, 
which ultimately lays the foundation for either the success or failure of civil society 
organizations.  It can therefore be determined through this case of Libyan civil society that the 
relationship between the absence of a defined political structure in the transition after Qaddafi’s 
removal and the political culture present for civil society organizations to work within has 
proven to be the primary factor in the strength and effectiveness, or lack thereof, of the 
developing Libyan civil society. 
 
Conclusions 
 Similar to other Arab states in the region throughout the twentieth century, Libya was 
controlled by a despotic and corrupt regime that repressed political representation and 
engagement in civil-state relations.  The country lived under deteriorating economic conditions 
and tyranny for decades until the wave of popular demonstrations and successful overthrow of 
authoritarian regimes in both Tunisia and Egypt provided the impetus for Libyans to come 
together and demand an end to Muammar Qaddafi’s infamous regime.  
 After the successful removal of Qaddafi in 2011, Libyan civil society organizations were 
able to emerge during this time of political transition in the hopes of taking an active role in the 
establishment of the civic sphere and the eventual stabilization and democratization of the 
country.  These organizations sprung up in exponential numbers since the uprisings and have 
come to engage in electoral monitoring, women’s rights, civil liberties, civic education, and 
countless other spheres.  Many have taken an increasingly active role in addressing the crucial 
needs and inherent rights of the population, specifically in female and youth empowerment, as 
well as in political and civic participation (Foundation 2011). 
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Nevertheless, while Libyans were able to overthrow the authoritarian regime, these civil 
society organizations have been significantly hindered in their role in the stabilization and 
democratization of the country.  This is a result of the instrumental relationship between the 
political structure and political culture of the country and the consequent environment these 
factors create for the involvement of civil society.   
Libya has not yet developed the necessary political culture to support and strengthen the role 
of civil society organizations as a result of the ongoing void in power and absence of a legitimate 
political structure. Thus, the environment necessary for civil society to play a successful role in 
stabilization and democratization has not yet arisen, which clarifies the hindered progress of 
Libyan civil society organizations over the past several years.  This confirms the vital 
relationship between the political structure and political culture of a state, specifically in that the 
absence of a legitimate form of political authority does not provide the necessary involvement 
and supporting political culture to facilitate the successful impact of civil society organizations. 
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The Case of Tunisian Civil Society 
With the spark of the Arab Spring in 2011 through Tunisian street vendor Mohamed 
Bouazizi’s self-immolation, Tunisia initiated a movement that resonated deeply throughout the 
region.  After decades of dissatisfaction with the corrupt dictatorship, the country came together 
to protest the oppression and lack of representation under the authoritarian rule.  They united 
under the decisive call to overthrow Ben Ali’s despotic regime and became the first country in 
the Arab Spring to take a stand against years of political, economic, and social injustices. 
Throughout the course of the demonstrations, Tunisian civil society organizations arose 
and played a vital role in the mobilization and unification of the country in 2011.  They united 
wide varieties of the population not only in overthrowing the authoritarian regime, but also in 
moving forward in the development of a new and democratic political system.  These groups 
heightened their levels of involvement and collaboration after the successful removal of Ben Ali, 
and they ultimately were able to facilitate institutional reform and bridge the political landscape 
on unprecedented levels (Deane 2013). 
Over the last several years, these organizations have come to play an invaluable role not 
only in merging the gap in opposing ideologies and groups in the political sphere, but also in 
laying the groundwork for a stable transition into a democratic and representative government.  
Thus, Tunisia is a leading example of a country in the Middle East that overthrew the 
authoritarian regime and is successfully on the path to establishing a new and democratic 
political structure through the successful role of civil society organizations over the last several 
years.  
 
Role of Civil Society prior to the Arab Spring  
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Preceding Tunisia’s vital role in igniting the Arab Spring demonstrations, Tunisians had 
long suffered from a lack of political voice and declining economic opportunities under President 
Ben Ali’s fraudulent regime (Gelvin 2012).  Corruption and a highly overbearing security 
apparatus dominated Tunisia’s political structure, and the involvement of civil society was 
dictated by authoritarian control.  The limited number of existing civil society organizations were 
severely monitored by the regime and restricted in purpose and activity; however, they were still 
able to benefit from the relatively unified and tolerant nature of Tunisian society, which greatly 
contrasted many other countries in the region (Foundation 2013). 
This political environment was a result of Ben Ali’s adoption of “selective liberalization” 
and a state-controlled civil society framework as a means to evade criticism regarding the 
country’s lack of democratic institutions (Deane 2013).  Thus, by the time of the Arab Spring in 
2011, there was a limited presence of Tunisian civil society organizations that operated in a 
restrictive manner due to the nature of the authoritarian political structure. 
 
Development of Civil Society throughout the Arab Spring 
The Tunisian dissatisfaction regarding the authoritarian, corrupt, and unrepresentative 
regime also extended on a regional level throughout the Middle East.  Thus, with the impetus of 
the international broadcasting of Tunisian street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-sacrifice, a 
wave of demonstrations transpired in several countries to demand political representation and 
democratic political structures (Gelvin 2012).   
While demonstrations quickly surfaced in Egypt, Yemen, and Libya, Tunisia executed its 
desire for change at an unrivaled pace with the help of civil society organizations.  These groups 
were able to collectively organize various demographics and bridge the gap between a variety of 
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organizations around their opposition to the regime.  They emphasized the inherent right to call 
for democratic change and political and socioeconomic freedoms as citizens, which facilitated a 
diverse and progressive unity of the Tunisian public (Deane 2013). 
From the start of the demonstrations in late 2010, Tunisian civil society played an 
essential role not only in the organization and mobilization of the population, but also in the 
successful overthrow of the authoritarian regime just one month after the protests had begun 
(Gelvin 2012).  These organizations unified to meet the needs of the population and came to 
facilitate the restructuring of state-society relations on a more engaging and inclusive level 
(Deane 2013).  They assumed an instrumental role not only in implementing the necessary 
political and institutional reforms, but also in aiding the transition to establish a newly 
democratic Tunisian government and inclusive public sphere.   
 
Role of Civil Society after the Removal of the Authoritarian Regime 
After the success of the demonstrations and the removal of a decades-long corrupt 
regime, Tunisian activists, lawyers, and civil society leaders came together to establish an 
interim government and initiate the process of political and institutional development 
(Foundation 2013).  The reforms led by civil society organizations began with constitutional 
reorganization, which entailed reallocating the unlimited power of the president to public 
representatives elected by the Tunisian people (Deane 2013).  These developments came to 
center upon the primary concerns based upon past Tunisian authoritarian regimes, namely in 
corruption and electoral viability.  Thus, the participating organizations established committees 
and institutionalized frameworks to address constitutional proceedings and future elections.   
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The first National Constituent Assembly was established in 2011 to facilitate the first free 
and fair elections in Tunisia, in which the En-Nahdha, or Renaissance, party won more than 41 
percent of the vote (Deane 2013).  With En-Nahdha’s victory, Tunisia was to be governed 
primarily by the Islamist opposition party, which raised numerous qualms on an international 
level regarding the ideology and goals of the newly elected leadership.  However, En-Nahdha 
united with two other parties after its triumph in the first election, the secular Congress for the 
Republic and the secular center party El-Takatol, or the Democratic Forum for Labor and 
Liberties (Deane 2013).  Under this majority coalition, En-Nahdha not only worked to represent 
the wide array of Tunisian political perspectives, but also recognized the vital engagement of 
civil society organizations. 
 
Strengthening of Civil Society through Laws of Association 
The Islamist En-Nahdha party prioritized the linkage between Tunisian civil society and a 
democratic and inclusive government during this transitional period.  Their efforts in 
engagement built upon the interim government’s first action in 2011 in instituting new laws of 
association under the Higher Authority for the Realization of Revolutionary Objectives, Political 
Reform and the Democratic Transitions (ICNL 2012).  These new laws detailed the specific 
freedoms and roles of civil society organizations, as well as provided greater accessibility for 
various facets of the population.   
With these new provisions, there were countless new capabilities and intended 
responsibilities for Tunisian civil society organizations. According to International Alert Middle 
East Adviser Shelley Deane, “Civil society organizations are encouraged to testify, comment on, 
and influence pending government policy and legislation... Civil society organizations are now 
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free from oppressive legal impediments and obstructive state registration requirements, while 
donors and funders of civil society organizations are free from state pressures.  Provision is made 
for associations to access information, evaluate the role of state institutions and submit proposals 
to improve performance, and organize meetings, conferences, demonstrations and all kinds of 
civic activities” (2013). 
These amendments also specified that both domestic and foreign civil society groups 
have the ability to register with the Tunisian authorities under the newly established and 
progressive civil framework.  Under these new laws, organizations would be able to maintain 
their independent mission and agenda and would also be granted significant autonomy in 
financial support (Deane 2013).  While both domestic and foreign funding had previously 
required approval, the amended law of association declared that authorization was not necessary 
so long as the funding originated from countries with diplomatic ties to Tunisia (Brudzińska 
2014). 
These new laws ultimately aimed to provide greater opportunities and autonomy for 
Tunisian civil society organizations rather than to hinder the capacity of these groups as under 
Ben Ali’s dictatorship.  Thus, the democratic transition in political structure in 2011 laid the 
groundwork for Tunisian civil society organizations to collectively reshape the country and 
transform the political culture, as well as facilitate the transition from an ingrained autocratic 
regime to a representative and democratic republic (Brudzińska 2014). 
 
Growth and Advancement of Tunisian Civil Society 
 As a result of these positive protections, many new civil society organizations sprung up 
in Tunisia in the following years as other traditional civic groups magnified their scope and 
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involvement throughout the country.  They worked to inform government decision makers and 
create a new political system centered on the mutual relationship between civil society 
organizations and state institutions.  This network also focused on the rights of the individual and 
his or her guaranteed public participation, while also recognizing the right of association and 
assembly on both an individual and civil society level.  These efforts inevitably led to a 
cooperative and inclusive environment and political culture that stimulated institutional change 
within the country (Deane 2013).   
This developing network of Tunisian civil society organizations also came to gain 
extensive knowledge in how to best interact with the political structure of the country and 
coordinate each group’s activities around unified objectives.  Many of these organizations 
worked to rally behind representation and the restoration of social justice, as well as in relieving 
unemployment and regional inequalities (Deane 2013).  They became connected under the 
precepts of economic and social demands for change and were able to establish countless 
coalitions, which was largely facilitated by the cooperation of activists and civil society groups 
on both a statewide and virtual level. 
Many traditional civil society groups that had narrowly existed during Ben Ali’s regime 
also welcomed greater involvement and took significant steps to facilitate the exchange of 
ideologies, resources, and different forms of dialogue within the new civil society-governmental 
relations.  Organizations that range from the General Union of Tunisian Workers to the Tunisian 
League for Human Rights have fostered greater collaboration across a wide array of civil society 
organizations and advocated for political change and reform (Al-Youssoufi 2014).  They have 
worked to create unparalleled levels of political participation and representation, as well as instill 
Zullo 51 
a new “spirit of solidarity” to emphasize the necessity of freedom of association and community 
empowerment (Deane 2013). 
These organizations have also worked to adopt their own levels of autonomy not only in 
purpose and involvement, but also in the international funding sphere.  Many of these civil 
society organizations have avoided foreign funding sources as a means to maintain their own 
initiatives and goals (Deane 2013).  They seek to maintain their own agenda and their “home-
grown civil society initiatives” rather than becoming tied to international strategic interests as a 
result of outside funding.  Nevertheless, while this growing network of civil society 
organizations has prioritized its right to autonomy under the new legal framework, there is still 
significant collaboration between Tunisian groups and international non-governmental 
organizations (Deane 2013). 
 
Positive Role of Civil Society in the Political Transition 
Other Tunisian civil society groups have arisen in response to the growing demand for 
new political bodies and institutions, namely in the electoral sphere.  Tunisia’s political transition 
has necessitated supportive associations in both the political and civic spheres, and civil society 
organizations have adapted in purpose and strategy in order to facilitate the comprehensive 
election process (Deane 2013).  Over the past several years, new political organizations have 
been established and coalitions have formed in order to encourage political participation, as well 
as monitor electoral probes and verify the official election count (National Democratic Institute 
2014). 
This sector of civil society has fostered a pluralistic nature in the establishment of the 
new Tunisian political system.  The structure of the power-sharing coalition has provided greater 
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access for newly established civil society groups, promoting high levels of public participation 
and engagement.  This involvement momentously aided in publicizing the parliamentary 
elections and encouraging voter turnout through targeting various population groups, specifically 
regarding both women and youth (National Democratic Institute 2014). 
With this developing political environment, Tunisia held its second round of 
parliamentary elections in October 2014 that were widely considered successful with seventy 
percent voter turnout (Ibish 2014).  These elections were considered free and fair, and both 
politicians and civil society organizations alike encouraged voter participation without any form 
of intimidation or violence.  Beji Caid Essebi, leader of the secular Nidaa Tounes party, took the 
victory with 85 seats in the People’s Assembly, marking a peaceful transition in power from the 
Islamist En-Nahdha party (Marks 2014).  Over the months following this monumental election, 
there was great progress and cooperation between the new government and civil society, and 
Tunisia put itself on track to being the single country that has been considered a success story 
since the Arab Spring (Zakaria 2014). 
 
Role of Tunisian Political Structure and Political Culture 
Many political scientists have come to question how civil society organizations were able 
to play an instrumental role in the stabilization and democratization of Tunisia and how this 
differs from various other cases of demonstrations throughout the Arab Spring.  While some 
argue that economic factors or international influences play a principal role, it is evident that the 
political structure of Tunisia and its transition from an authoritarian regime to a freely elected 
parliament was the primary determinant in strengthening the role and involvement of civil 
society organizations. 
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In the case of Tunisia, the existing political structure was and continues to be the crucial 
factor in the success and strength of civil society organizations.  This is attributed to the 
conditional relationship that exists between the political structure of a state and its political 
culture (Pateman 1971).  Under the authoritarian reign of dictator Ben Ali, Tunisian civil society 
organizations were present, yet operated in very limited and restricted forms and were unable to 
bolster the necessary level of support to facilitate democratic change.  However, with the 
removal of Ben Ali and the transition into a democratically elected parliamentary system, civil 
society organizations have been able to assume an indispensable role in the political structure of 
Tunisia and transform the political culture of the population. 
 
Impact of a Strong Parliamentary System on Civil Society 
Through this restructuring of a strong representative assembly, power has been 
distributed throughout the Tunisian political system over negotiations and the development of 
formal codes, laws, and regulations (Deane 2013).  This has provided an open environment for 
independent political institutions and civil society organizations to access the government. As 
International Alert Dr. Shelley Deane states, “The structure of the political system shapes the 
way civil society organizations act.  A strong parliamentary system tends to have fewer barriers 
to entry for civil society organizations, with fewer restrictions and regulations on civil society 
organizations, activities and funding sources… In a strong parliamentary system of government, 
civil society organizations are more likely to be viewed as agents who can inform government by 
articulating the preferences of civil society.” (2013). 
 This new presence of a strong parliamentary structure in Tunisia has fostered greater 
access points for civil society organizations with fewer restrictions and regulations on their 
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activities and funding resources.  Tunisians have been able to target investment in institutional 
reform and have evaluated the role of state institutions as a means to improve their effectiveness 
and performance throughout a wide array of civic activities (Deane 2013).  This stable balance 
and distribution of power has allowed for a more fertile terrain for pluralism, which ultimately 
has laid the foundation for institutions and civil society organizations to strengthen the country’s 
democratic transition (Zakaria 2014). 
 
Conditional Relationship between Political Structure and Political Culture 
Despite this linkage between the political structure and political culture, some political 
scientists continue to question how Tunisia’s success story differs from those of other Arab 
Spring states who were able to overthrow the authoritarian ruler, but were still unable to facilitate 
the successful involvement of civil society organizations in the stabilization and democratization 
processes, namely in the case of Egypt (Zakaria 2014).  The difference between the successful 
impact of Tunisian civil society in the democratization process as compared to the Egyptian 
failure is a direct result of the respective political structures of the countries and the 
corresponding level of freedoms and involvement of the political culture.  
In examining the case of Egypt, the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood party won the first 
parliamentary election after the removal of dictator Hosni Mubarak, as in the case of En-Nahdha 
in Tunisia. Upon taking power, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood sought complete control of the 
country and continuously resorted to authoritarian tactics throughout its short-lived rule.  Little 
progress or development had occurred in terms of the political structure of the country, and just 
one year after taking power, the Muslim Brotherhood was overthrown in July of 2013 after 
another great wave of protests and civil unrest. 
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On the other hand, the Islamist En-Nahdha party won a plurality of the votes in Tunisia 
and consequently shared power under a coalition with a wider array of parties as a precept of the 
newly established parliamentary assembly.  This transition to a system of power sharing and 
pluralism inevitably provided Tunisian secular parties with the opportunity to voice their 
opinions, as well as obtain a majority in future elections.  Consequently, these sentiments 
regarding the new political framework provided the Tunisian public with the hope and 
confidence that their vote would be represented, which greatly influenced the political culture of 
the state (Zakaria 2014).   
While some argue that the significant contrast between Egypt and Tunisia in the success 
of the political transitions was a result of the ideologies of the Islamist parties, it is evident that 
the political structure of each respective country was the primary determinant in the political 
culture in both Egypt and Tunisia, which establishes the foundation for civil society 
involvement.  Thus, the combination of Tunisia’s shift to a strong parliamentary system in 
political structure and the corresponding increase in governmental confidence and involvement 
within the political culture was essential to the success and strength of civil society organizations 
within the country.  
 
Conclusions 
After four years of efforts to establish a new political system and a framework for civil 
society and state institutions to co-evolve, Tunisia has successfully held two rounds of 
parliamentary elections and is adapting in its transition into a democratic government.  It 
currently stands as the sole success story of the Arab Spring demonstrations, specifically in that 
Tunisian political leaders, activists, students, and countless facets of the population united under 
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civil society organizations to overthrow the authoritarian regime and pave the way to 
democratization. 
Tunisian civil society organizations have played a vital role in the transition from Ben 
Ali’s corrupt and authoritarian regime to the newly developing and freely elected parliamentary 
system.  The transformation in the political structure of the country from an autocratic executive 
to a strong parliament provided Tunisian civil society with greater opportunities and freedoms in 
shaping the new civil-state relations.  Through these increased entry points, they were able to 
transform the political culture of the country to support institutional reform and enhanced 
political participation, which culminated in the facilitation of the country’s first free and fair 
parliamentary elections in 2014.    
 This successful involvement on behalf of Tunisian civil society organizations was 
initially possible as a result of the transition in political structure.  This transition did not simply 
entail the overthrow of an authoritarian ruler, but rather the restructuring of the political 
leadership, namely in the shift from an authoritarian regime dominated by the executive 
leadership to a strong parliamentary assembly.  Tunisia’s new parliamentary system has allowed 
for parties to govern by coalitions and power sharing approaches, which has fostered 
unprecedented levels of pluralism and cooperation.  This shift in the political structure ultimately 
transformed the political culture of the country and provided Tunisian civil society organizations 
with the foundation to take an active and integrated approach in aiding the democratization 
process.  Thus, the development of a supportive political culture is contingent on a country’s 
political structure, and this relationship is the primary factor in determining the relative strength 
and impact of civil society organizations.  
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V. Conclusions 
As quests for democratization and the upholding of inherent human rights have turned 
violent with no end in sight, the potential role of civil society organizations has evolved as a 
major facet of conflict resolution.  Civil society organizations have come to play a successful 
role in the aftermath of conflicts that span from Eastern Europe to Latin America, namely in 
emphasizing community-based contributions to peace building and laying the foundation for 
democracy and individual empowerment (Belloni 2001). 
However, as armed conflicts have developed in increasing numbers throughout the Middle 
East, the role of civil society organizations has been greatly hindered in serving as a driving 
force for democratization.  The relative strength of these organizations is dependent on a variety 
of factors, which include the role of socioeconomic development, the existing political 
environment, and international influences (Bailer, Bodenstein, and Heinrich 2009).   
Each of these factors has the potential to influence the strength of civil society organizations 
in the stabilization and democratization processes; however, this study has come to examine the 
relationship between the political structure and political culture as the primary factor in 
determining the role of civil society organizations in both conflict-ridden and post-conflict 
Middle Eastern countries in the last several years. 
 This relationship between the political structure and political culture is instrumental in 
establishing the environment for civil society organizations to arise and assist in the process of 
development and stabilization.  The political structure of a country determines the patterns of 
interaction within a political system and the regulations, laws, and norms present.  It ultimately 
determines the role of the corresponding political culture and institutions, which incorporates the 
set of attitudes and practices held by a people that shapes their political behavior (Cohen 1994).   
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Therefore, a political structure that fosters action-orienting ideals and encourages political 
participation can facilitate a political culture that expands the existing rights, democratic 
institutions, and social solidarity for the population (Deane 2013). 
 In this study, I selected three case studies of countries in the Middle East that each 
experienced a rise in the number and activity of civil society organizations prompted by the 
events of the Arab Spring.  I examined the existence of civil society organizations alongside each 
country’s respective political structure and consequent political culture both before and after the 
Arab Spring, as well as the relative strength and limitations of these organizations.  From the role 
of civil society in these three case studies, I conclude that the conditional relationship between 
the political structure and political culture of each case study is the primary determinant of the 
strength of civil society organizations in the stabilization and democratization processes. 
 
Impact of the Conditional Relationship between Political Structure and Political Culture 
 The application of this relationship is instrumental to the role of civil society organizations 
throughout various phases of conflict and post-conflict transitions.  As seen in Syria, Libya, and 
Tunisia, the status of each country’s respective political culture is dependent on the political 
structure of the country.  In all three of these cases, an authoritarian regime had reigned over the 
country for extended periods of time, each with a tyrannical ruler.  This dictated the political 
structure of each country, namely in establishing the oppressive manner in which the government 
ruled over the people and stifled participation and opposition. 
 The respective political structures that had long been ingrained in Syria, Libya, and Tunisia 
served as the primary determinant in how the social sphere developed, namely the political 
culture.  Because of the authoritarian and corrupt nature of these regimes, there was a significant 
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lack of space and legal provisions for socialization, association, and organized forms of 
communication, all of which encompass the political culture.  Organizations and institutions did 
not have accessibility to engage in state-society relations under the authoritarian political 
structures, which created an absence of independent civil society organizations for several 
decades. 
 However, the Arab Spring provided the impetus for civil society organizations in Syria, 
Libya, and Tunisia to rise up as a means to advocate for democratic change and assist in bringing 
an end to the authoritarian regimes.  They multiplied with the wave of demonstrations in each of 
these cases and have worked for the past several years to provide the necessary services and 
resources depending on the greatest needs and priorities of the respective populations. 
 While these civil society organizations were able to grow and engage in shaping civil-state 
relations during the period of transition, both Syrian and Libyan organizations were greatly 
limited in their involvement, while Tunisian organizations were successful in assisting the 
stabilization and democratization of the country. This differentiation in the role of civil society is 
a consequent result of the relationship between the political structure and culture of each of these 
cases.  The political structures of both Syria and Libya have determined the political climate and 
institutions of each country, specifically in the nature of Syria’s authoritarian and repressive 
regime and Libya’s significant lack of a legitimate political framework.  These structures have 
contributed to ongoing instability and warfare and have ultimately not provided the necessary 
norms, roles, practices, and competencies for a supportive political culture to take place.  Thus, 
civil society has been greatly impeded in progress towards stabilization and democratization 
within these two cases as a result of this conditional relationship. 
 On the other hand, in the case of Tunisia, the transition to a strong parliamentary political 
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structure after the Arab Spring opened up the space for socialization, association, and organized 
forms of communication within society.  This allowed for a political culture that facilitated 
public participation and pluralistic ideals, which came to provide Tunisian civil society 
organizations with the foundation to play an active and successful role in the stabilization and 
democratization process.  
Some American scholars have argued that a variety of factors individually influence the 
strength of civil society organizations, such as the independent role of political culture in the 
“bottom-up” approach of civic engagement (Putnam 1995); or in contrast, the sole impact of 
political institutions in influencing civil society in the “top-down” approach (Skocpol and Fiorina 
1999).  Focusing on these contesting theories in isolation from each other has yielded 
inconclusive results on an international scale and ultimately overlooks the vital conditional 
relationship that leads to a strong civil society (Bailer, Bodenstein, and Heinrich 2009). Thus, 
this study determines that the competing bottom-up and top-down approaches must be viewed in 
conjunction with each other—specifically in terms of the causal relationship between the 
political structure and political culture—in order to examine the consequent political, social, and 
economic environment that determines the role of civil society. 
 
Moving Forward 
The conclusions reached regarding the relationship between political structure and 
political culture and its impact on the role of civil society are based on the studies of only three 
countries in the Middle East.  Each of these cases is characterized by a different political 
structure and consequent political culture, and accordingly has resulted in varying levels of 
success in the role of civil society organizations.  There are limitations to this study, namely in 
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the subjectivity regarding the relative strength and success of civil society organizations.  A scale 
to measure the scope, breadth, and collective activities of civil society organizations has not yet 
been adapted in the region and research is limited in empirical information.  There is also 
restricted access to information because the work of these civil society organizations frequently 
cannot be made public due to the nature of the regimes. 
Future research will ideally include additional case studies of various other countries in 
the region and the role that civil society organizations play in stabilization and democratization.  
Further examples of successful civil society involvement could be analyzed in comparison to 
those cases in which civil society organizations have been limited, which can also be extended 
on an international scale.  Studying cases throughout history and other regions of the world in 
both conflict-ridden and post-conflict areas may provide more information about the conditional 
relationship between political structure and culture and how to best facilitate the future 
successful role of civil society organizations. 
Thus, this study concludes that the dependent relationship between the political structure 
and political culture is the primary factor in determining the role of civil society in the 
stabilization and democratization processes.  The critical connection between the two factors 
determines the nature of the political environment for civil society and can either result in an 
adverse and encumbering system, or rather a supportive and accessible framework for successful 
civil society involvement.  
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